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Abstract—The threat of hardware reverse engineering is a
growing concern for a large number of applications. A main
defense strategy against reverse engineering is hardware obfusca-
tion. In this work we investigate physical obfuscation techniques,
which perform alterations of circuit elements that are difficult
or impossible for an adversary to observe. Examples of such
stealthy manipulations are changes in the doping concentrations
or dielectric manipulations. An attacker will, thus, extract a
netlist which does not correspond to the logic function of the
device-under-attack. This approach of camouflaging has garnered
recent attention in the literature.
In this paper, we expound on this promising direction to
conduct a systematic end-to-end study of the VLSI design process
to find multiple ways to obfuscate a circuit for hardware security.
This paper makes three major contributions. First, we provide
a categorization of the available physical obfuscation techniques
as it pertains to various design stages. There is a large and mul-
tidimensional design space for introducing obfuscated elements
and mechanisms, and the proposed taxonomy is helpful for a
systematic treatment. Second, we provide a review of the methods
that have been proposed or in use. Third, we present recent and
new device and logic-level techniques for design obfuscation. For
each technique considered, we discuss feasibility of the approach
and assess likelihood of its detection. Then we turn our focus to
open research questions, and conclude with suggestions for future
research directions.
I. INTRODUCTION
The threat of hardware reverse engineering is a growing
concern for a large number of applications, from consumer
electronics and cyber-physical systems all the way to military
systems. The are two broad goals an adversary might pursue:
(1) learning the functionality of the device-under-attack and
(2) gaining knowledge that enables manipulation of the target.
With respect to the first goal, reverse engineering of ICs may be
motivated by a number of reasons. For example, the adversary
may wish to steal IP for their own use, or to resell IP without
licensing. They may also wish to analyze a device to gain a
competitive advantage or to leapfrog technology. Regarding
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the second goal, active design manipulations, a particularly
attractive target for attackers are implementations of hardware-
based security functions such as cryptographic algorithms or
random number generators. An attacker may want to learn
the details of a security module with the goal of subsequently
weakening it or inserting carefully crafted Trojans. In addition
to manipulating security modules, an adversary can also be
interested in adding or disabling functionality to commercial ICs
[1]. Note, however, that a reverse engineer does not necessarily
need to pursue illegal or ethically questionable objectives.
An “adversary” in the reverse engineering setting can also
represent a stakeholder attempting to discover IP violations
or faulty product designs. Furthermore, reverse engineering
for competitive reasons is legal in most Western countries,
including the United States and the European Union [2]. A
further discussion of adversary goals is given in Section II.
The problem of hardware reverse engineering is not only
theoretical or limited to powerful adversaries. Numerous
hardware attacks over the last few years have shown the ease of
removing coating and de-layering circuits [3], [4], [5], [6], [7].
Moreover reverse engineering is also increasingly supported by
CAD tools such as Chipworks’ ICWorks and the open-source
tool Degate [8]. In addition, reverse engineering equipment
such as scanning electronic microscopes and Focused Ion Beam
(FIB) have become considerably more accessible over the past
decade due to wide-spread availability in research labs and a
drop in price for new and used equipment.
An IC designer who wants to prevent reverse engineering
has a difficult task because the adversary will have physical
possession of the chip. Since physical anti-tamper measures
to prevent invasive attacks are technically and economically
infeasible in most applications, the designer’s main line of
defense is obfuscation of the hardware. There are two principal
approaches to hardware obfuscation: structural obfuscation and
what we coin physical design obfuscation1.
Structural obfuscation — which tries to hide the true
functionality of the device-under-attack through techniques such
as randomized placement of logic elements, irregular routing
or dummy wires — is widely used in industry. Unfortunately,
structural obfuscation does not prevent the adversary from
recovering the complete netlist through de-layering. With
1We would like to clarify the terminologies: The terms physical de-
sign/physical mechanism used in this paper refer to device and interconnect-
level techniques that can be used for obfuscation. It does not refer to physical
design methods used for placement and routing of circuits.
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2structural obfuscation, she faces the task of learning the
functionality from the recovered netlist which has a structure
that makes this very task more complicated. However, given
enough resources and time, an attacker will most likely succeed.
This situation is analogous to software reverse engineering. In
both cases, the designer does not have a true advantage over
the attacker, i.e., the situation is symmetric in the sense that the
adversary can observe whatever methods the designer employs.
This paper addresses the second family of techniques,
physical design obfuscation, which performs alterations of
circuit elements which are difficult or impossible to observe
for the adversary. Examples of such stealthy manipulations
are localized changes in doping concentrations, dielectric
manipulation, and open connections in the sub-nanometer range.
In contrast to “classical” structural obfuscation, when stealthy
manipulations are used, the adversary will extract a netlist
which does not unambiguously correspond to the logic function
of the device under analysis (DUA). Gate camouflaging is
one such approach to physical design obfuscation [9], [10].
Gate camouflaging and similar techniques are promising, as
they give the designer a true advantage of knowledge over
the adversary. For a successful reverse engineering attack, the
adversary has to recover both the basic design structure and
also the stealthy manipulations; the former is easy to recover
while the latter should be hard. This situation is akin to classical
cryptography in which an cryptographic algorithm is known
while the key is secret and must be learned by the attacker.
Due to the asymmetry of the setting which gives the designer
an advantage, this approach to obfuscation has the potential to
provide strong protection.
Despite the promise of this approach, there is scant treatment
in the literature and industry on this topic. The contribution
at hand attempts to give a comprehensive treatment to the
emerging and promising area of physical design obfuscation.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We present a taxonomy of physical design obfuscation
techniques (Sec. III).
• We investigate existing and novel physical design obfus-
cation techniques at the device level (Sec. V)
• We investigate novel methods for employing physical
design obfuscation at the logic-level (Sec. VI) by utilizing
the device-level techniques.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that
the topic of physical design manipulations for obfuscation is
taxonomically surveyed. We believe this work will be valuable
for industry, where ad-hoc methods dominate the issue of circuit
protection through obfuscation. The proposed work also has
the potential to initiate further research related to physical
design mechanisms, as well as research in realizing complex
circuits and evaluating them with respect to resistance to reverse
engineering.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the
adversary setting and Section III introduces a taxonomy for
physical design obfuscation. In Section IV we summarize
related work. As main contributions, we discuss in Sections V
and VI the various physical manipulations and logic-level
mechanisms, respectively, that can be used for obfuscation.
The paper concludes with a discussion of open challenges in
Section VII.
II. ADVERSARY SETTING
Hardware obfuscation is a tactic used by a designer to hide
functionality from an unauthorized third party. In order to
systematically treat the somewhat murky question of hiding,
two aspects about adversaries need to be addressed. First, what
are the possible objectives of an attacker, and second, what are
her capabilities? The answers to these questions influence how
successful a given obfuscation technique can be.
We note that the chip manufacturer (foundry) has perfect
information about the layout on all levels, including the details
about physical obfuscation methods. Hence, a manufacturer can,
at least in theory, understand circuit functionality despite all
physical obfuscation methods that may be employed. However,
in most civilian applications, the designer’s primary concern
is not an adversary who is in cohort with a foundry. The
far more common case is an adversary who is in possession
of one or more obfuscated ICs, and who attempts to extract
information about the circuit. As we will see below, attackers
can vary widely with respect to goals (which information he
wants to extract) and his capabilities (what he can observe and
manipulate). This class of attack is sometimes referred to as
Man-at-the-End (MATE) attack in software security community
[11].
A. Objectives of the Adversary
The most obvious goal of an attacker — to extract the
complete function of the circuit realized by the device-under-
attack from its physical structure —- is only one of many. For
instance, in competitive analysis, the adversary might merely
be interested in learning which algorithms are being used in
a given product. Such objectives are often less complex and,
thus, easier to achieve. We refer interested readers to the work
of Rostami et al. [12] for more background on this issue. As
noted earlier, a hardware reverse engineer does not necessarily
need to pursue illegal or ethically questionable objectives, but
she can also attempt to discover IP violations or faulty product
designs. Below we list some common goals of an adversary,
roughly ordered from easiest to hardest.
1) Learning the device properties and design rules of fabri-
cated ICs (process analysis). For instance, the estimated
design rules for an Intel 22nm tri-gate process can be
obtained by commercially-offered reverse engineering
for $16,000 USD [13].
2) Learning the location of sensitive signal wires or buses.
This information can enable subsequent use of targeted
micro-probing to extract internal data values. These
values may be immediately relevant as in the case of
cryptographic keys, or the values may provide more
information about the design, e.g., state bits of an Finite-
state machine (FSM) or register values.
3) Learning which specific IP blocks or algorithms are
being used in the target design. This does not require
learning the details of the implementation. Possible
3motivations include competitive intelligence or detection
of IP violations.
4) Learning the Boolean function of combinational logic,
or the FSM of sequential logic (circuit extraction). This
can apply to the entire IC or only certain parts which
are proprietary and/or sensitive. The adversary’s goal
might be to clone or even alter the product.
5) Learning the logic function of each gate and the
interconnections between them. This implies learning
the overall Boolean function, but also includes additional
information about exactly how the function is imple-
mented, and the extra information could enable side
channel attacks etc. The incentives for this are the same
as in the previous point, and an additional incentive is
for performing detailed competitive analysis.
6) Learning the GDSII of an entire IC or of parts, e.g., an IP
block. This will enable the adversary to re-manufacture
an identical IC in the same technology. This is the
highest value information that can be obtained by reverse
engineering.
B. Capabilities of the Attacker
The effectiveness of obfuscation will depend on the assumed
capabilities of the attacker. Publicly available tools are available
to facilitate these methods of attack [8]. Torrance and James [2]
give an overview of the state of the art for reverse engineering
in 2011. The following provides some attacker capabilities
ordered roughly from weakest to strongest.
1) The attacker is able to observe all I/O activities and can
create and manipulate input values at will.
2) The attacker is able to decapsulate the IC and to probe
values on block-level I/O boundaries or top-level metal
layers between blocks with approximately 1k–10k gates.
3) The attacker is able to observe the state of sequential
elements at any time as would occur with scan chain
access; Rajendran et al. [9] assume their attacker to
have this ability.
4) The attacker is able to delayer chip and learn all
metal layers and corresponding vias but is not able
to distinguish real from dummy vias; this implies ability
to identify gate structures as done by Nohl et al. [3]
and others.
5) The attacker is able to delayer chip and resolve sub-
gate-level width and spacing of metal or polysilicon
features of layers. Torrance and James [2] note that
optical imaging suffices to extract such finer details at
technologies above 0.18µm, and that Scanning Electron
Microscope (SEM) can accomplish the same below
0.18µm if the dielectric is removed.
6) The attacker is able to detect dopant programming
of transistors using techniques like passive voltage
contrast [14].
7) The attacker is able to delayer chip and further can
distinguish between vias and fake vias; Rajendran
et al. [9] and others assume an attacker that lacks this
capability.
A summary of various measurement techniques that can be
used in reverse engineering is presented in Table I.
TABLE I. VARIOUS MEASUREMENT TECHNIQUES USED IN REVERSE
ENGINEERING
Technique Capability Cost
PICA imaging [15] Observe transistors switching High
SQUID Microscopy [16] Observe constant current from shorts High
Scanning Electron Microscopy
(SEM) Imaging of features below 200nm [2] Moderate
Optical Microscopy (OP) Imaging of features down to 200nm [2] Low
Passive Voltage Contrast (PVC) Detect Doping Low
III. A TAXONOMY FOR PHYSICAL DESIGN OBFUSCATION
In the literature, low-level hardware obfuscation has rarely
been treated in a systematic way. At the same time, there is
a large and multi-dimensional design space for introducing
hardware obfuscation. In fact, there is a wealth of physical
design obfuscation techniques which result in stealthy circuits,
i.e., circuits whose realized logic behavior differs from the
apparent logic function extracted during reverse engineering.
We propose a taxonomy in order to systematically treat this
multifaceted topic. In fact, many obfuscation techniques often
blur the boundaries between these layers. Nevertheless, these
layers are helpful for systematic organization of apparently
disparate physical manipulation techniques. In normal VLSI
design process, successive transformations from one abstraction
layer to the next result in the final physical design. However
in obfuscation, the goal is to add/subtract some information
specific to cross-layer transformations. Therefore, describing
obfuscation purely in terms of extracting the higher levels of
abstraction from lower level is complicated and may not always
be possible. For example, we can introduce layout artifacts to
deliberately induce obfuscation through signal integrity which
has no gate-level functional equivalent at the logic abstraction
layer. It is for this reason, we introduce a different nomenclature
for expressing obfuscation instead of using standard VLSI
design abstractions.
Hardware obfuscation based on stealthy circuit manipulations
can be viewed in a three-layer model, shown in Fig. 1. The lower
two layers are formed by (i) device and interconnect mecha-
nisms (bottom layer) and logic-level mechanisms (middle) layer.
They are in hierarchical structure, i.e., logic-level mechanisms
are based on the device and interconnect manipulations. These
two layers are forms of physical design obfuscation and are
the subject of this contribution. Physical design obfuscation
provide the basic mechanisms with which actual obfuscation
techniques can be realized. Such techniques form the top layer
in Fig. 1. We elaborate on each of the three layers below.
Bottom Layer: Device-level mechanisms refer to measures
such as re-sizing of transistors or interconnect manipulations.
Even though there are numerous such possible alterations, they
can be classified into three groups. Each of the groups has a
certain type of effect on the circuit, as shown in Fig. 1: (i) stuck-
at-faults, (ii) stealthy signaling and (iii) delay manipulation.
Stuck-at-faults refer to changes that cause certain circuit
nodes to have a constant logical 0 or 1, even though the apparent
circuit structure might imply some other function.
4Stealthy signaling refers to situations where an adversary may
be unable to tell whether physical structures are communicating,
and this includes both direct connection and non-contact
influencing mechanisms such as cross-talk.
Delay manipulation refers to techniques that make a node
switch slower or faster than it would appear to, and uses this
to change the sequential behavior of a chip.
Middle Layer: Logic-level mechanisms The logic level
is concerned with circuit structures which are built from the
stealthy manipulations from the bottom layer described above.
In subsequent higher system layers, the logic-level elements
are used as building blocks for actual obfuscation techniques
to protect integrated circuits. These logic-level mechanisms
form the second level of abstraction and can to some extent be
independent of the specifics of the device-level mechanisms (i.e.,
sizing, dopant, etc). For example, one can design a circuit that
uses physically obfuscated look-up tables while abstracting
away the lower level, i.e., what physical mechanisms are
actually used to create the obfuscated look-up tables.
Top Layer: Obfuscation Techniques The last layer of
the obfuscation hierarchy is used by techniques such as gate
camouflaging, component obfuscation and FSM obfuscation.
These higher-layer techniques can be used to protect complex
circuits and systems that are realized on an IC. There have
been several interesting proposals for securing hardware using
obfuscation techniques.
Most of the higher-level obfuscation techniques on the top
layer of Fig. 1 have been published relatively recently, cf.
Section IV. However, there is a void regarding which underlying
physical design mechanisms exist for realizing higher-level
obfuscation. The focus of the contribution at hand is to provide
a comprehensive treatment of the lower-level mechanisms. First,
we introduce in a structured way a variety of device and
interconnect mechanisms which can be used for physical design
obfuscation in Section V. The second focus is on logic-level
mechanisms which are discussed in Section VI, i.e., techniques
which belong to the middle layer in the figure.
IV. RELATED WORK
Even though hardware obfuscation has been used for a long
time in commercial and military ICs, the topic had received
scant treatment in the scientific community. However, over the
last few years, the general area of hardware protection has
become more active. Roughly speaking, the proposed methods
can be classified into system- and circuit-level techniques, and
we summarize related work below.
A. System-level Techniques
Some of the system-level methods that have been proposed
can be viewed as “classical” obfuscation approaches, whereas
others are more general techniques for circuit protection, i.e.,
their focus is not directly on hiding of elements.
Component Obfuscation: Many reverse engineering tech-
niques engage in component recognition. Techniques have been
proposed to increase the complexity of delineating components
by changing the logic gates at the output and input boundaries
Fig. 1. A structured view on physical design obfuscation: device & interconnect
mechanisms on the bottom layer and logic mechanisms on the middle layer
enable actual obfuscation techniques on the top layer.
of connected blocks (Boundary Blurring) [17], replacing an
entire circuit with an obfuscated equivalent (Component Fusion)
[18], [19] and targeting interconnections between two blocks
for encryption [20].
Obfuscation with Programmable Logic: Wendt et al. pro-
pose replacing subset of gates of a circuit with Physically
Unclonable Function (PUF) and FPGA-based logic [21]. The
PUF is assumed to be unique and unclonable, and the connected
FPGA is used to reproduce functionality of the replaced logic.
This approach provides a custom solution for each chip but it
comes at considerable area and run-time costs.
FSM Modification: Alkabani et al.[22], [23] propose FSM
modification techniques for the purpose of locking a chip by
obfuscating its power-up state. Only the correct key input
sequence allows the circuit to be initialized correctly. Li and
5Zhou [24] propose a methodology for obfuscating sequential
circuits and embedding a secret key in the power-up state of the
IC that must be present to unlock full unthrottled performance.
Chakraborty and Bhunia [25] propose a methodology to perform
simultaneous obfuscation and authentication of an SoC design
netlist.
Related Techniques — Logic Encryption: Logic encryp-
tion is a relatively recent hardware security concept introduced
by Roy, Koushanfar and Markov [26]. In logic encryption,
additional gates are added to the design such that only the
correct input values, considered the key, allow the circuit
to work as intended. Wrong values can lead to corrupted
output [27] or even can lock the circuit. Logic encryption
can be an effective tool against over production, however, it
is not effective against invasive attacks. It has been shown
that it is possible to reverse engineer logic encryption keys
in time that is linear in the number of keys [28] and quite
efficient in practice using Boolean satisfiability problem (SAT)
solving [29]. An attacker may also be able to observe the added
logic and trace the key inputs by using imaging techniques.
B. Circuit-level Obfuscation
The primary goals of circuit-level obfuscation methods
have been to create or modify cell libraries to hide gate
functions and adding non-essential structures to the design. The
underlying assumption for these approaches is that an adversary
is presented with extra complexity when reverse-engineering
the logic.
Camouflaged Cells: Obfuscation via camouflaging of cells
can be achieved through custom design to either mimic other
cells or to allow for post-manufacturing programmability to
customize gate functions. Relevant literature dealing with cell
camouflaging can be found in patents by Baukus et al. [30],
[31] and Cocchi et al. [32].
Filler Cells: Chow et al. [33] and Cocchi et al. [10] deal
with utilizing filler cells with routing in a realistic fashion
to create a dense network. Some of the cells may even be
connected to the functional logic but do not hamper its operation.
The filler cells and their associated routing increase the amount
of data that an attacker will need to sort through during reverse
engineering in order to extract the underlying logic.
C. Hardware Security Surveys
Erstwhile research has resulted in extensive surveys on
protecting hardware intellectual property (IP). The work by
Tehranipoor and Wang [34] provides a good understanding of
various aspects of hardware security and trust with focus on
all types of electronic devices and systems. Colombier and
Bossuet [35] provide a detailed discussion on protection of
design data and IP with exhaustive survey of previous research
into hardware protection. Guin et al.[36] provide a thorough
analysis of the problem of counterfeiting and examine various
countermeasures including hardware obfuscation. These papers
provide a summary of various hardware obfuscation techniques
proposed in literature. In contrast, the focus of this paper is
on surveying physical design manipulation mechanisms and
presenting device- and logic-level techniques for hardware
obfuscation.
Fig. 2. Use of atypical doping to make an apparent PMOS transistor realize
a constant-VDD output.
V. DEVICE-LEVEL MECHANISMS
In this section, we discuss physical design obfuscation
through device-level techniques, which we consider to be
manipulations of transistors and the interconnections between
them. These obfuscations variously aim at creating stuck-at
faults, delay faults, virtual connections which are stealthy to
the attacker, or to increase the reverse engineering effort by
introducing extraneous information. A summary of the impacts
of these device-level techniques is given at the end of this
section in Tab. II. In the following we focus on the most
significant ways for each mechanism to influence the behavior
of the design, but note that there is significant overlap and
ambiguity between them, for example, steathly signaling, and
stuck-at faults or timing faults.
A. Device Specific Mechanisms
1) Source/Drain Doping for Stuck-at or Timing Faults:
In semiconductor manufacturing doping is one of the major
techniques to modify the electrical characteristics of transis-
tors. Doping concentration can be used to change transistor
characteristics with little or no change in transistor geometry,
which makes it hard for an adversary to observe them directly.
Fig. 2 shows the layout of a PMOS transistor; under normal
conditions, the source and drain regions are doped with P-
type dopant. If those regions are instead doped with N-type
dopant, a short circuit is created between the drain and source
terminals. This type of dopant manipulation has been used
to create stuck-at faults and create Trojans [37]. Similarly, a
circuit with such dopant characteristics can be used to confuse
the attacker by providing pretentious information about the
circuit’s functionality. An example of how this can be exploited
for obfuscating CMOS circuit is discussed in Section VI-A1.
2) Channel Doping for Stuck-at or Timing Faults: Similar to
source/drain doping, channel doping can be varied to change
the characteristics of transistor. By controlling channel doping,
a transistor can be configured as depletion or enhancement
type. In an enhancement type, the channel is implanted rather
than induced, the transistor is always on. This can be used to
create stuck-at faults. An example of how this can be used for
obfuscating CMOS circuit is discussed in Section VI-A1.
Multi-threshold design is a well-known technique where
multiple threshold transistors are used in the same digital
6Fig. 3. Dishing and Erosion
design to achieve power-performance trade-offs [38]. As the
threshold of a transistor depends on channel doping, channel
doping can be used to subtly manipulate performance to create
non-obvious designs. Examples of how threshold voltage can
be exploited in flip-flops, pass transistors and dynamic logic
circuits are discussed in section Sections VI-A4, VI-A2 and
VI-A3, respectively. Multiple publications and patents deal
with the usage of dopant manipulation techniques to achieve
obfuscation [39], [30], [31], [40], [32], [41].
3) Reversing Dopant Obfuscation: From an attacker’s per-
spective, even though doping does not change geometry, it is
possible to detect source/drain doping changes by using passive
voltage contrast (PVC) method [14]. However, PVC requires
the use of scanning electron microscope (SEM) or focused ion
beam (FIB), and this makes PVC analysis slow, especially when
there are millions of transistors involved. An attacker can also
use picosecond imaging circuit analysis (PICA) [15] to detect
channel doping, but this is more expensive than PVC [14].
B. Interconnect Specific Mechanisms
1) Manipulating Inter-Layer Dielectric for Timing and Stuck-
at Faults: Chemical Mechanical Planarization (CMP) is the
process used to flatten each fabricated layer of a circuit after
printing the layer features. CMP can adversely affect the final
layer profile due to the phenomena of dishing and erosion as
shown in Fig. 3 [42]. The extent of dishing and erosion depends
on line width and density [42]. Metal-fills help to provide line
density uniformity across chip to allow for predictable CMP
performance, and for this reason pattern density is commonly
constrained by design rules. A basic model for the relation of
ILD thickness (z) and pattern density at a given location (x, y)
was proposed by Ouma [43] and is given by (1). Manipulating
the variables of (1) allow deliberate control of dishing and
erosion for the purpose of obfuscation. For example, metal-fills
surrounding an interconnect line can degrade the line during
fabrication if placed at improper distances from it [44]; in
obfuscation scenarios, this can be used to create a deliberate
stuck-at or timing fault.
z =
{
z0 − Ktρ0(x,y) if t <
ρ0z1
K
z0 − z1 −Kt+ ρ0z1 if t > ρ0z1K
(1)
where:
• K oxide polishing rate
• z0 thickness of oxide deposition
• z1 initial step height
• t total polish time
• ρ0(x, y) initial oxide pattern density before CMP
Fig. 4. Illustration of a Metal-fill influencing a signal line via capacitive
coupling
2) Dummy Logic to Increase Reverse Engineering Effort: In
semi-custom design flows, with cell rows and standard cells, not
all rows can be fully utilized by the design. The resultant unused
space is filled with extra gates, called back-fills. This extra
logic is useful to make late-stage design changes, for debug,
or for replacing bad cells during fabrication. Obfuscation can
be achieved by combining unused back-fills with metal-fills to
create junk logic. This increases complexity of the design that
an attacker needs to decipher. Effective utilization of metal fills
to harden a design against an attacker is proposed by Baukus
et al. [45] and Cocchi et al. [10]. In addition to increasing
the volume of data that an attacker needs to process, there is
also increased uncertainty as to which metal traces are real
and which are extraneous. Further, connecting the metal fills
to power, ground, switching signals or keeping them floating
reduces the effectiveness of reverse engineering techniques like
voltage contrast.
3) Stealthy Signaling using Crosstalk: Metal-fill can also
be used for stealthy signaling by exploiting the parasitic
capacitance between neighboring interconnects [46], [47].
Metal-fills are usually connected to VDD/ GND to reduce
crosstalk effect on nearby signal lines. If the Metal-fills nearby
to a target signal line are connected to a clock or other
controllable line, then they will induce strong and controllable
crosstalk on the signal line. For example, using crosstalk in this
manner, the Metal-fill can raise an interrupt signal by inducing
a noisy signal higher than the threshold level (VTH ) of the
buffer on an interrupt line. Through proper design, only the
designer has knowledge of when the interrupt will be raised.
This can be utilized to obfuscate the functioning of a particular
block by creating a secret interrupt unobservable by an attacker.
We illustrate this in Fig. 4.
Manipulation of Inter-Layer Dielectric (ILD) is a potential
control knob for facilitating stealthy capacitive signaling
using crosstalk. ILD is made from low-κ dielectric materials
to enhance interconnect electrical performance by reducing
capacitive coupling and the resultant crosstalk noise between
adjacent lines. Air pockets are also introduced to further reduce
the effective κ but care should be taken not to compromise the
mechanical strength of the ILD [48]. To support obfuscation,
a particular ILD layer can be thinner than normal or made
of higher κ material to increase capacitive coupling between
interconnects across adjacent layers and increase crosstalk.
Crosstalk model for two adjacent wires is shown in (2) and (3).
7Fig. 5. Zigzag routing for crosstalk
Since metal lines in adjacent layers run perpendicular to each
other, one can maximize crosstalk by running one interconnect,
the victim, in one layer and another interconnect, the aggressor,
in adjacent layers in a zigzag pattern (Fig. 5). ILD thinning
maximizes the crosstalk induced by this inter-layer zig-zag
pattern. Without extensive electrical measurement to estimate
the magnitude of crosstalk that may occur between a pair of
neighboring lines, a reverse engineer will find it difficult to
extract any functionality that depends on crosstalk.
∆Vvictim =
Cadj
Cgnd − v + Cadj
1
1 + k
∆Vaggressor (2)
k =
τaggressor
τvictim
=
Raggressor (Cgnd−a + Cadj)
Rvictim (Cgnd−v + Cadj)
(3)
4) Via Alterations for Stealthy Signaling: Via manipulation
techniques for obfuscation rely on the fact that most reverse
engineering efforts delayer the chip without detailed inspection
of the vias that connect the layers to each other. An attacker
usually assumes the existence of a via based on the information
from the metal layers, thereby recovering incorrect logic. Chow
et al. [49] first proposed using a dummy via to give the
appearance of a connection between a M1 layer metal and
source/drain of a transistor. However, the inserted via ended
in a field oxide close to the active layers of the transistor.
Chow et al. [50] later proposed using dummy vias between
interconnects on two metal layers such that there appears to be
a connection, but in reality there is not. Rajendran et al. [9]
have showcased the use of a generic layout with multiple via
sites. The vias are either designated as true or dummy during
design, and the same layout is used to implement multiple
functionality.
The process of via formation has been described extensively
[51], [52]. Controlling via formation provides another venue for
obfuscation. One possible obfuscation technique is to increase
ILD thickness such that the via is not fully formed or is very
thin and breaks during burn-in. This can be utilized to create
stuck-at faults in a circuit known only to the designer. Effective
ILD thickness can be increased locally without affecting the
rest of the layer as explained previously by using metal-fill
density to control dishing and erosion as shown in Fig. 3 [42].
5) Lithographic Printability Features to Manipulate Timing:
Optical Proximity Correction (OPC) and Sub-Resolution As-
sist Features (SRAFs) are techniques used to improve the
Fig. 6. OPC compensation techniques: (a) Serifs for Corner-rounding, (b)
Hammerheads for Line-end shortening and (c) Line Biasing for Line-width
shrinking
Fig. 7. Interconnect mask lines with Hammerheads in two adjacent layers
printability of patterns on a fabricated chip. In obfuscation,
these techniques can be used to give fine-grained control
over fabricated structures and their delays. OPC addresses
three major types of pattern distortions that occur during the
fabrication process — corner rounding, line-end shortening
and line-shrinking. These are compensated for by use of serifs,
hammerheads and line-biasing OPCs, respectively [53], [54].
The various distortions and their associated compensations are
illustrated in Fig. 6 [54].
In obfuscation, changing or removing line-biasing compen-
sation enables thinning of the interconnect and increasing the
line resistance. This affects the delay through the interconnect
due to changes in the RC time constant, where R is the line
resistance and C is the capacitive load on the line. The delay
change can be utilized by the designer to introduce delay faults
between flip-flops where a particular signal is biased such that
it always arrives late and is never latched to the next stage. If a
reverse engineer is unaware of this, they would infer incorrect
logic from this line.
Manipulation of hammerheads can similarly slow down
signals when they cross layers through vias at the end of
the lines. Size of the hammerheads account for the effects of
lithography, etching and also, for mask misalignment tolerances.
By shaping or removing the hammerheads and changing the line
alignments we can create an open on the interconnect crossing
layers. Also, we can create a weak connection between two
lines on different layers by partial misalignment, as illustrated
in Fig. 7 where ∆x and ∆y alignments control whether the
lines are connected or not.
SRAFs are features smaller than the smallest required feature
printed on a die. They are used to improve the printability of
8the desired patterns during the lithography process, equalize
lithographic performance between isolated and densely placed
features, and increase wafer yield. Melvin et al. [55] explain
where SRAFs are usually placed. Many works [56], [57], [58]
also deal with methodology for efficient placement, shaping
and sizing of SRAFs. While proper SRAF placement improves
printability of the target feature, primarily, via reduction in edge
placement error [56], it is also possible to degrade the feature by
altering the placement [58]. Thinning the line using SRAFs can
be utilized in the same manner as line-biasing OPC to change
resistance and cause timing faults. Ideally SRAFs should not
be printed. In reality, there are tiny artifacts that are left behind
due to SRAFs after completion of the manufacturing process. It
is possible to size the SRAFs such that these final artifacts are
of significant size to affect the legal features adjacent to them,
like adding parasitic capacitance to a nearby interconnect.
OPC and SRAF-based manipulations will require high
resource investment to implement. Many factors that might
affect the printing of features during manufacturing are difficult
to control. SRAFs increase the number of constraints in the
design rules and their properties are adjusted constantly during
post-layout lithographic simulations to improve yield. Hence,
a designer will need to work with the foundry engineers to
effectively utilize OPC and SRAFs for obfuscation. However,
the high expense may have a corresponding high payoff, as
the small manipulations caused by OPC and SRAFs will also
be very difficult for an attacker to account for in his models.
6) Reversing of Interconnect Manipulations: For the tech-
niques that use mask manipulations or metal-fills, an attacker
using imaging techniques, like SEM, can only observe features
in two dimensions (x,y). The delayering process removes the
vertical dimension information. The attacker will require SEM
to study the interconnect thickness variations to comment
on changes in time constants. The interconnect obfuscation
mechanisms are more useful in the lower metal layers where
the majority of the signals are routed and the interconnect
density is high. An attacker will have to invest a large amount
of time to find potential sites of interest.
Also, interconnect misalignment techniques may not be
detected due to the requirement of correlating measurements
in two different lower metal layers which may fall below the
resolution of the microscopy technique used. It is possible
for an attacker to detect open/short faults on interconnects of
interest using Superconducting Quantum Interference Device
(SQUID) microscopy [16]. The attacker will still need to narrow
the search to the target area by using other electrical techniques.
To get information about the dielectric thickness of various
layers, an attacker will need to slice the chip and observe the
vertical layers through some microscopy technique. However,
the dishing and erosion effects are localized and may not be
reflected at the plane of the cut. Hence, inter-layer dielectric
manipulation to affect crosstalk and via alterations cannot be
easily found through microscopy techniques.
VI. LOGIC-LEVEL MECHANISMS
The second aspect of physical design obfuscation is con-
cerned with logic-level structures. Circuit structures are needed
to translate the low-level device and interconnect obfuscation
mechanisms of the previous section into building blocks, which
can be used for realizing complex sequential logic functions.
These (primarily combinational) circuit structures form the next
level of abstraction. As mentioned earlier, they can sometimes
be agnostic of the underlying physical mechanisms (i.e. sizing,
dopant, etc). In this section, we discuss novel logic-level
techniques for obfuscation based on device-level mechanisms
described in Section V.
A. Circuit Transformations for Obfuscation
The device-level mechanisms described in Section V have to
be coupled with circuit topologies to create obfuscated circuits.
The physical mechanisms can, for example, create a stuck-at
faults or timing faults in a circuit to change its behavior without
changing its appearance. After employing these mechanisms
to change the circuit behavior, the realized function of the
circuit will differ from its apparent function. Because the
modified circuit may violate common circuit truths, e.g., signal
propagation and timing, a reverse engineer cannot successfully
assume these truths to hold when trying to reconstruct the
circuit function. If a reverse engineer can no longer exploit these
simplifying assumptions, then his task will become significantly
more challenging. In the following subsections, we present
examples to show that different circuit implementation styles
present different opportunities for obfuscation.
1) CMOS circuits: CMOS circuits can be obfuscated to
protect the design and confuse an attacker by using various
device manipulations. For example, consider the circuit shown
in Fig. 8 implementing the logic Y = A · (B + C). Using
the mechanisms described in Section V-A the circuit can be
morphed to realize a logic different than its apparent one. If
transistor M5 and M6 are converted from enhancement type to
depletion type MOSFETs by doping, they will be always on.
Similarly, if transistor M2 is converted to an open circuit using
source/drain doping, the node between M2 and M3 will be
floating [37]. These changes would together cause the circuit
to realize the functionality of an inverter Y = A¯ instead of its
apparent function of Y = A · (B + C). Similarly, the circuit
function could be modified by using the mechanisms described
in Section V-B, such as via alteration, to change the behavior
of the interconnects that drive the circuit inputs. For example,
if SA1 faults are created on the interconnects driving the B
and C inputs, the circuit would again realize the function of
an inverter, even if the transistors are unmodified.
2) Pass Transistors: Pass transistors are used as logic
switches to create paths between the input and output nodes.
Relative to CMOS logic, pass transistor logic is bidirectional
and can be faster and reduce transistor count and power. Hence,
pass transistor logic is often used in multiplexers, switches and
efficient XOR implementations. The doping mechanisms from
Section V-A allow for controlling the threshold voltage of pass
transistors to create chosen stuck-at faults that modify circuit
behavior.
Fig. 9 (a) shows cascaded logic using three pass transistors.
It is possible to obfuscate the logic by using a high-threshold
transistor for M1 so that the voltage drop through the transistor
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Obfuscation Classes
DetectionStuck-at
Faults
Timing
Faults
Stealthy
Signaling
Physical
Design
Mechanisms
Doping
Source/Drain 7 PVC
Channel 7 7 PICA
Metal-fill 7 7 7 SEM
ILD Manip
Thinning 7 7 -
Thickening 7 7 7 -
Intercon mask manipulation 7 7 7 SEM, SQUID
SRAFs 7 -
Fig. 8. An example of CMOS logic obfuscation
Fig. 9. Pass transistor circuits. (a) Cascaded pass transistors, (b) 2:1 Mux
using pass transistors
is large enough for the cascade output to always be perceived
as logic-0. This means that the input to the inverter at the end
of the cascaded logic is always logic-0 and node Out realizes
a stuck-at logic-1. The values applied to the gates of pass
transistors M2 and M3 are irrelevant in this example, but this
would not be apparent to the attacker.
Fig. 9 (b) shows an apparent 2 : 1 multiplexer where one
can similarly induce faults such that M5 is always open and
M4 is always closed. The realized logic function after these
changes would be Y = A instead of a multiplexer.
3) Dynamic Logic and Differential Cascode Voltage Switch
(DCVS) Logic: Dynamic logic and Differential Cascode Voltage
Switch (DCVS) logic finds use in high-speed applications
[59] where an NMOS pull-down network is preferable for
Fig. 10. Dynamic Logic
Fig. 11. Differential Cascode Voltage Switch (DCVS) Logic
performance reasons. Fig. 10 and Fig. 11 illustrate dynamic
logic and DCVS logic, respectively. The two circuits as depicted
are sensitive to changes in transistors M1 and M2, so a natural
approach to obfuscation is to manipulate these transistors. For
example these transistors can be made stronger or weaker using
doping and channel length biasing as described in Section V-A,
creating stuck-at faults at the outputs irrespective of the inputs.
An attacker that cannot observe the properties of M1 and M2
would not be able to discern that the computational logic is
irrelevant to the output value.
4) Flip-flops: Large sequential digital systems are composed
of combinational logic and state-holding elements such as flip-
flops. A flip-flop circuit that may appear to be a state-holding
element can be manipulated to instead always hold a particular
value. For example, consider the circuit shown in Fig. 12.
Signal A is connected as the input to the flip-flop and from
appearances would be expected to be sampled on the clock
edge and passed on to the output of the flip-flop. In reality, by
inducing a stealthy stuck-at fault, the output of the flip-flop can
be assigned logic-0 or 1. For an attacker who tries to extract
the logic, the circuit may appear to have a logical connection
from Block 1 to Block 2 but the realized function has no such
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Fig. 12. Flip-flops under obfuscation
Fig. 13. Setup and Hold Violations illustration
connection. Multiple such scenarios can be created with flip-
flops that are inserted only for the purpose of increasing the
complexity of reverse engineering the design.
Setup and Hold Violations: Synchronous sequential systems
with flip-flops typically need to obey setup and hold time
constraints to function as intended. Setup time requirements
specify that flip-flop input signals must not change immediately
before a clock edge, and hold time requirements specify that
flip-flop input signals must not change immediately after a
clock edge. Intentionally violating these requirements can create
predictable errors that can be employed for obfuscation. For
example, consider the circuit shown in Fig. 13. The path from
FF1 to FF2 through the combinational logic has to obey the
setup time requirements at FF2 for a given clock period to
operate without error, and a reverse engineer would typically
assume this to be the case. If the devices and interconnects
on a logic path were slowed down using techniques such as
high-threshold transistors and interconnect thinning (Sec. V),
the setup time would be violated, and the realized sequential
behavior would differ from the apparent behavior. Similar to
setup time violations, hold time violations can be induced but
may require compound manipulations to speed up paths and
induce errors.
Pulsed Latch: Pulsed latch based flip-flop designs are
common in high-performance systems where they are deployed
to improve performance and reduce power dissipation [60].
Pulsed latches retain the advantage of both flip-flop and latch-
based design. Instead of using master-slave latches with a clock,
the pulsed latch has a single latch and uses a pulsed clock
so that the latch is only open for a short time. The circuit to
generate a pulsed clock, and the associated waveforms, are
Fig. 14. Manipulating the clock signal used in Pulsed Latch
shown in Fig. 14. The behavior of the latch critically depends
on the pulse width and timing, and one can subtly induce
setup and hold time violations or race-through conditions by
manipulating the pulsed clock. The width and timing of the
pulsed clock can be manipulated by changing the delay of the
inverter and the AND gate, respectively; slowing down the
inverter increases the pulse width, and slowing down the AND
gate will delay the arrival of the pulsed clock. An attacker
would typically assume that a pulsed latch would be free of
conditions such as flow-through, so these changes would cause
the realized function of the latch to differ from the apparent
one. Timing manipulations may be challenging for an attacker
to detect during scan testing, because the scan chain is usually
run at much slower speeds than the standard circuit operation.
B. Promoting Physical Mechanism to Logic Level
The previous subsection dealt with numerous ways to
manipulate circuits, but now we focus specifically on gates
that use a set of indistinguishable physical structures to
implement different Boolean functions. An adversary observing
this ambiguous physical structure will not know which logical
variant of the gate he is seeing. Yet, it is important to note that,
when using indistinguishable gate structures to realize multiple
functions, the obfuscated gates will be larger in size and have
a different pattern than the non-obfuscated gate variants that
implement the same functions. So, if a design uses a mixture
of obfuscated and non-obfuscated gates, then the attacker will
likely have knowledge of which gates are obfuscated, which
can help localize the uncertainty for reverse engineering. The
reverse engineering problem becomes even more constrained
when only a small number of gates are obfuscated [9] in this
way. By contrast, for the mechanisms in the previous subsection,
an attacker may have to consider every component in the design
as potentially misleading.
1) Look-up tables: Any physical mechanism that creates
obfuscated 0 or 1 constants can be used to program obfuscated
look-up tables for fully programmable logic gates. An n-input
look-up table requires 2n programming bits to store the desired
output bit for every input combination. The programming bits
would be implemented as nodes that are forced to be either
stuck-at 1 or stuck-at 0 using one of the techniques from Sec. V.
For example, the programming bit could have vias connecting
to ground and vdd, and the attacker would have to determine
which via is the dummy and which is real to know whether the
corresponding gate output value was 0 or 1. An advantage of
look-up tables is that they are fully general logic structures, but
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the disadvantage is that they are much larger than the CMOS
logic gates that perform the same functions.
2) Programmable Logic Array (PLA) Cross Points: As with
look-up tables, obfuscated connections can be used to program
a PLA to resist reverse engineering. The PLA cross points
that are connected would be indistinguishable from the open
connections from the perspective of attacker.
3) Restricted Choice of Gate Functions: A less general
alternative to look-up tables is to use gates that can implement
just a few different logical functions, with the choice among the
functions being determined by some hard to observe mechanism
such as doped channel stops [30]. The work of Rajendran
et al. [9] addresses the problem of how to use a small number
of obfuscated gates to efficiently obfuscate an overall circuit
function. Their work specifically considers a 2-input gate
structure that has indistinguishable variants for implementing
XOR, NAND, or NOR functions; learning which function the
gate implements requires ability to distinguish between true
vias and dummy vias. A similar style of obfuscated gate is
proposed by Malik et al. [41].
C. Obfuscation Countermeasures: SAT Solving to Assist Re-
verse Engineering
Given a set of possible component implementations, and
ability to query the obfuscated circuit to learn the correct
computed values for any input, one can use an oracle-guided
synthesis approach [61] to reconstruct the functionality of
an obfuscated block of combinational logic. In practice, this
procedure is quite effective due to the impressive capabilities of
modern SAT solvers. SAT solving is used both for synthesizing
new inputs that should be applied to the oracle, and is also used
for deobfuscating the design once a sufficient set of input-output
examples is obtained. For more details on this approach, we
point interested readers to the work El Massad et al. [62]; their
work shows that the logic function of a circuit with 200 obfus-
cated gates, each capable of implementing NAND/NOR/XOR
(3200 possible logic functions), can be identified in less than an
hour after observing just tens of input/output vectors [62]. Later
work extends El Massad’s attack using incremental SAT solvers
for more efficient implementation [63]. This sort of attack can
be applied to any context where the attacker knows a set of
possible functions for each component, and can apply inputs and
observe corresponding outputs through a scan chain. In certain
types of obfuscated circuits, there is no attempt to hide the
locations of components with obfuscated functions, and only the
specific functions implemented by those components are secret.
The ability to clearly identify obfuscated and non-obfuscated
components helps to minimize the exponential increase in
the space of possible circuit functions that must be implicitly
searched during oracle-guided synthesis. We conjecture that
low-level stealthy changes will be less susceptible to oracle-
guided synthesis approaches because an attacker will not be
able to identify a priori the non-obfuscated components in
the circuit, and must therefore consider every component to
be suspect yielding a much larger space of possible circuit
functions that could be implemented.
VII. DISCUSSION AND CHALLENGES
In above sections, various physical mechanisms that can
be used for obfuscation were introduced. Below, we briefly
discuss two related concepts, hardware Trojans and tamper
protection techniques. We conclude this paper with a discussion
of challenges and open research problems.
A. Hardware Trojans vs Obfuscation
While physical design obfuscation aims at protecting a design
through various low level manipulations as discussed above,
hardware Trojans can potentially exploit the same techniques
to insert malicious functionality into a target circuit [37]. More
concretely, what are sometimes called parametric Trojans [64]
are quite similar to the mechanisms discussed in Secs. V and
VI. There are, however, several important differences between
Trojans and obfuscation. First, Trojans have malicious intent
and are therefore inserted by adversaries in the design flow,
while obfuscation is introduced by designers aiming to protect
a circuit. Second, Trojans and obfuscation have vastly different
reliability requirements. An obfuscated design is expected to
work with high reliability, similar to any other circuit, or else
the function implemented would be incorrect. In contrast, a
low-reliability Trojan can still compromise the security of a
system, even though its malicious intent, e.g., leaking of a
cryptographic key, is not fully reliable. Third, often it must be
possible to trigger a Trojan, e.g., through certain input values, a
requirement which is entirely absent in the case of obfuscation.
Finally, the requirement of being stealthy is often more crucial
in the case of obfuscation, as the adversary specifically tries
to overcome the stealthiness, something that is not always the
case for hardware Trojans.
B. Tampering Protection
Hardware reverse engineering usually requires physically
tampering with the target circuit. Obfuscation techniques, such
as the ones described in this contribution, are one approach
to provide on-chip protection by preventing the attacker
from learning the logic function. Orthogonal to obfuscation
techniques are tamper protections that prevent an attacker from
even accessing data or silicon layers. Various countermeasures
have been proposed to protect against physical access of circuits,
and we mention here only a few of them. A prominent example
is the IBM 4748 co-processor. It envelopes the hardware in a
tamper-sensing and tamper-reactive shell along with tamper-
triggers that can signal the processor to wipe all sensitive data
and burn fuses [65]. While this can protect cryptographic keys,
it does not prevent an attacker from accessing the circuit to
extract the IP. An approach to protecting the actual circuit
is described in Mikulec et al. [66], based on a process that
embeds gadolinium nitrate channels in silicon. If this layer were
to be ground, it would explode and destroy nearby components.
The assumption is that such a layer is placed at the top of the
chip to provide protection against delayering.
A principle problem of physical tamper protection is that an
attacker often has access to more than one chip. This allows
him to devise strategies by running experiments which attempt
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to overcome the countermeasures. Even if several chips are
destroyed, there is the risk that she eventually succceeds. The
successful attack against a Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
chip with strong tamper resistant features is an instructive
example [67]. Nevertheless, for devices with low- to medium-
security requirements, physical tamper protection can be an
attractive approach. We note that tamper protection can be
combined with the physical design obfuscation described in
the contribution at hand.
C. Challenges
In this paper, we attempt to provide a systematic way to
look at physical design obfuscation, together with several
concrete examples for achieving low-level hardware obfuscation.
As mentioned in the introduction, circuit obfuscation has
only received scant attention in the scientific community and
there are several challenging (and interesting) open research
questions.
In the field of software, obfuscation techniques have been
studied at depth and several complexity metrics have been
developed. These metrics relate to potency, stealth, performance
and resource cost. A good description of these can be found
in Collberg et al. [68]. For hardware obfuscation, there are
no metrics to quantify how well a circuit has been obfuscated.
Often an adversary can “guess” or make conjecture about
the functionality of a circuit. Such guesses may be based on
design size, design density, power dissipation or any number of
circuit characteristics that often characterize a specific function.
Availability of diagnostic methods and commercial tools can
lead an attacker to find the locations where a circuit may
have been obfuscated. Availability of formal methods and tools
may even allow an attacker to validate her hypothesis using
measurements from the circuit. Most formal methods perform
search in an exponential space. However, knowing that an
adversary must search an exponential space to find the correct
model says little about the practical hardness of his task. Current
generation of Boolean SAT solvers demonstrate impressive
capability in tackling large circuits. Thus, how well a circuit
has been obfuscated is a complicated question that ensnares
several different research questions into one. Quantifying the
hardness of any obfuscation solution can go a long way towards
engineering adoption.
Another important question is the stealthiness of the obfus-
cation, i.e., the device and logic-level techniques discussed in
this paper. The strength of the methods heavily depends on
the capabilities of the attackers: This is difficult to quantify
yet important for determining the strength of an obfuscation
techniques. There is a large design space for combinational
and sequential circuits that lend themselves to the obfuscation
methods discussed in this contribution. Little is known about
optimum ways to design such circuits, which provide high
security and at the same time keep the area and power
overhead low. Related to this question is the CAD integration
of obfuscation, i.e., an automated design flow which maps an
arbitrary high-level design description to a circuit with strong
reverse engineering resistance.
Another research direction is related to the practicality
of any obfuscation solution. What is the impact on design
cost (also known as non-recurrent engineering cost), schedule,
manufacturing overhead, performance, area, and impact on
yield? Practicality of the solutions also relates to ease of
integration with existing tools and methodologies, or clear
description of requirements to enable development of CAD
tools for automatic obfuscation. It can be argued that this
practical question is crucial for the use of physical design
obfuscation in practice.
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